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ABSTRACT 
Relevance theory has been developed as a general model for explaming the cognitive 
mechamsms underiying human verbal communication. As all theories, Relevance has been 
built up on several mitial hypotheses. In this paper, it will be argued that if Relevance theory 
intends to be a theory of linguistic performance, what is one of the most characteristic 
hypotheses of Relevance theory, i.e., the 'communicative hypothesis', should be weakened 
because of the existence of noncommunicative uses of language. Thus, the main aim of this 
paper is to work out the consequences that a weakened communicative hypothesis would have 
on the 'principie of relevance', and on pragmatic theories in general. In this paper, then, it will 
be maintained that the 'principie of relevance' cannot be the only principie governing human 
linguistic performance, at least if its formulation is not changed. 
1. The 'communicative hypothesis' and the 'principie of relevance' 
It is very usual to think of language as a tool to convey one person's ideas to other human 
beings. That is, all of us have the capacity to communicate intentionally ideas to anyone who 
shares our language. Moreover, it is easy to show that human beings cannot acquire a 
specific language unless we have been immersed in communicative situations. 
From these, very simple observations, it may be concluded that to communicate 
something is the usual goal of language use, and that communication is an important pillar 
of language. These conclusions constitute what will be dubbed 'the weak communicative 
hypothesis'. hi some sense, the weak communicative hypothesis is commonsensical. Let us, 
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however, introduce some technical terminology, so that this hypothesis may be stated as 
follows: 
The weak communicative hypothesis (ftrst versión) 
Usually, the speaker uses the language because he or she has the intentíon to 
communicate a set of assumptions {I}. 
The set of assumptions {1} referred to in (1) stands for the huge set of beliefs held, in this 
case, by the speaker.' In Sperber and Wilson's words, "by assumptions, we mean thoughts 
treated by the individual as representations of the actual world" (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986:2). 
This hypothesis may be strengthened in order that , it may be claimed, all uses of 
language are communicative, and that communication is the only pillar of language. Let us 
refer to this last hypothesis as 'the strong communicative hypothesis', which may be defined 
as follows: 
The strong communicative hypothesis (ftrst versión) 
When the speaker uses the language, he or she always has the intention of 
communicating a set of assumptions {I}. 
A brief history of this hypothesis is drawn in Sánchez de Zavala (1990). Sánchez de 
Zavala pointed out that speech act theory, Grice's theory of conversation, and the 'new 
Prague School' adopt this hypothesis in a more or less explicit way. Moreover, discourse 
representation theory (DRT), and similar theories like Heim's File Change Semantics and 
semantics based on dynamic logic, embrace the strong communicative hypothesis too. 
As most pragmatic theories do, Relevance theory holds the strong communicative 
hypothesis. Verbal communication, according to Relevance theory, consists of making clear 
a set of speaker's intentions.2 That is, an utterance automatically reflects two different 
speakers' intentions: the intention to convey a piece of information, which is called the 
'informative intention' and the intention to inform the audience of one's informative 
intention, which is the 'communicative intention' proper. 
Then, when a speaker utters a sentence, he puts forward his intention to modify the 
cognitive environment of the audience. In Sperber and Wilson words, "[a]s speakers, we 
intend our hearers to recognise our intention to inform them of some state of affairs" 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 23). 
Now, Relevance theory goes one step further by making a claun on the cognitive 
structure of human beings. According to Relevance theory, we all, due to the psychological 
mechanisms we are endowed with, process information efficiently. This means that the 
processing system makes a balance between the effects that the process produces and the 
efforts that making the process cost. 
In verbal communication, when the benefits of the effects that a sentence produces in 
a context3 makes the efforts worthwhile, the information processed is relevant.4 Now, 
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Relevance theory claims, the utterance of a sentence is an act of ostensión, and as such, it 
comes with a guarantee of relevance. This is, then, the principie of relevance: 
Principie of relevance 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own 
optimal relevance. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 158) 
In turn, the presumption of optimal relevance is defined as follows: 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
The set of assumptions {/} which the communicator intends to make manifest 
to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to 
process the ostensive stimulus. 
The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have 
used to communicate {/}. 
(Sperber & Wilson 1986: 158) 
The principie of relevance predicts that the speaker is trying to convey as much 
information as possible because only then is the audience able to process the speaker's 
utterances. Obviously, communication can fail. This may happen when the information 
conveyed is still known to the audience, or when the speaker wrongly calculates the 
addressee's mental state.5 But, Sperber and Wilson claim, the speaker is still trying to be 
relevant. In fact, "[the principie of relevance] is not something that they [people] obey or 
might disobey; it is an exceptionless generalisation about human communicative behaviour" 
(Wilson & Sperber, 1988: 140) 
Now, it is clear that the principie of relevance depends on the strong communicative 
hypothesis. Moreover, by Sperber and Wilson's definition of communication, it follows that 
an utterance has to be as informative as possible in the context where it has been uttered.6 
Therefore, thanks to the principie of relevance, the addressee may recover the speaker's 
meaning of an utterance. 
However, it will be argued in this paper that the strong communicative hypothesis not 
only is not commonsensical,7 but is incomplete (if it is intended to cover all types of 
linguistic performance).8 That is, the mainaim of this paper is to show that the step from the 
weak to the strong communicative hypothesis is not licit, at least if the term 
'communication'' is to maintain some theoretical interest. This will be shown in section 2, 
where some examples of noncommunicative uses of language will be offered. 
The second main aún of this paper is to uncover the consequences that giving up the 
strong communicative hypothesis has for Relevance theory, and on pragmatic theories in 
general. Then, section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the role that the principies postulated 
by different pragmatic theories play in the explanation of linguistic performance. 
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Finally, some conclusions concerning the nature of pragmatic theories will be drawn in 
section 4. Now, the communicative and informative import of different language uses has 
to be discussed. 
2. Are there noncommunicative or non informative uses of language? 
It is sufficient to pay some attention to everyday life to recognise that even when we rest in 
silence, we are talking to ourselves. This inner speech accompanies us regularly. It is, then, 
quite evident, that inner speech is not communicating anything. It may be objected, 
however, that when using inner speech, we are acting as if we were communicating facts 
to ourselves. Certainly, it is possible to imagine such a duplicity in our minds. But, the 
applicability of the basic insights of Relevance theory to this new situation is troublesome. 
In fact, itshould be assumed that we have to keep our own attention, that we have to convey 
relevant information to ourselves, etc. In sum, the proposals of Relevance theory cannot 
adequately be adapted to inner speech. 
A second case of non-communicative use of language is when the speaker addresses no 
one. That is, soliloquy is a frequent human linguistic activity, even though it is not 
communicative in any clear sense.9 It is very possible, for example, to speak aloud when 
we are alone just because the situation we are in makes us feel fear or happiness or it 
triggers any other emotion. 
Similarly, all cases of Iinguistically ietting off steam' can hardly be taken as 
communicative even though, in this case, an audience may be present. One case at hand is 
when we feel guilty for some harmful situation, and, finally, we 'explode' and begin to 
speak. The words uttered in these situations are, probably, not directed to the audience, if 
there is one, and many none the less, are intended to convey as much information as 
possible. 
In other cases, it is usual to speak to pets or things even though the speaker knows that 
they will not understand our words. Again, the informative content of the words uttered 
does not play the central role of linguistic performance. In some sense, it may be said that 
in all these examples, the linguistic activity is more important than the informative content. 
This is, in fact, what happens in an example mentioned by Sperber and Wilson 
themselves. It is the case of filibusterers (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 159). When 
filibusterers speak, they do not primarily intend to convey information, even though in fact 
they do. On the contrary, they just intend to 'lose time' for delaying their triáis. Then, 
Sperber and Wilson say: "All the usual features of verbal communication are present and 
even salient, but for one: there is no attempt at optimal relevance." (my emphasis) (Sperber 
& Wilson 1986: 159). 
Sperber and Wilson take the case of filibusterers as rare. But here, it is being shown that 
this is not as isolated a case as they pretend it to be. If this is true, it is not possible to ignore 
all these cases. At this point, however, it may be argued that all the cases offered in this 
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section are, after all, cases of communication, even though they are not genuine cases of 
communication. 
Communication, in Sperber and Wilson's sense, is an intentional change of me 
cognitive environment of the audience. Certainly, any sentence contains an informational 
contení, even füibusterers'. But, from this fact it does not follow that the speaker who utters 
a sentence always intends to convey its informative content. Then, two types of 
communication may be distinguished: 
Genuine communication 
In genuine communication, the speaker has primarily the intention to make 
manifest to the addressee a set of assumptions {1}. 
Non-genuine communication 
In non-genuine communication, the speaker makes manifest to the addressee a, 
set of assumptions {1}, but his or her primary intention is not to do it, or s/he has 
not any communicative intention at all.10 
Note that non-genuine types of communication are different from communicative uses 
of language in which the speaker tries to hide information. When the speaker's aim is to 
hide information, it may be said that she acts as ifshe were trying to be relevant. On the 
contrary, in the non-genuine cases of communication, the speaker is not trying to be 
relevant at all. 
According to (6), then, all the examples posed up to this point in this section may be 
understood as non-genuine cases of communication. Now, the weak and the strong 
communicative hypotheses may be re-stated as follows: 
The weak communicative hypothesis (second versión) 
All uses of language are communicative, even though they constitute a genuine 
or a non-genuine case of communication. 
The strong communicative hypothesis (second versión) 
All uses of language are cases of genuine communication. 
This second versión of the strong communicative hypothesis is clearly false. Therefore, 
any theory of linguistic performance should adopt the weak communicative hypothesis as 
definedin(7). 
To sum up, in this section it has been shown that there are uses of language which are 
cases of non-genuine communication, and that these cases are less rare than it may be 
thought. Therefore, the strong communicative hypothesis has to be rejected. 
Now, as has been said, the principie of relevance seems to imply the strong 
communicative hypothesis. In the next section, then, whether the principie of relevance can 
be adapted to the weak communicative hypothesis, as defined in (7) has to be analysed. 
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3. Is the 'principie of relevance' applicable to non-genuine communicative uses of 
language? 
The main conclusión of the last section was that language use cannot be reduced to genuine 
verbal communication. The immediate consequence is that if a theory able to cover all 
verbal communication is looked for, Sperber and Wilson's principie of relevance has to be 
somehow changed. 
At first glance, two possibilities arise. First, Relevance theory may be kept to explain 
genuine communicative uses of language. This means that an independent theory for the 
non-genuine communicative uses of language should be developed. In this case, there would 
be two dífferent theories of linguistic performance: a theory for acts of ostensive 
communication and a theory for non-genuine communication activities. Whereas the former 
theory could be established using the parameters of Relevance theory, the latter should be 
built up with new and completely different tools. 
From a purely theoretical point of view, however, having a unified theory of linguistic 
performance is preferable.'' 
Alternatively, the principie of relevance may be weakened to enable the principie to 
explain all cases of communication. How can this move be made? There are two places 
where the principie of relevance makes a universal or extreme claim. The first one is when 
the principie says that "every act of ostensive communication" indicates its own optimal 
relevance.u The second one lies in the concept of 'optimal relevance' itself. 
Therefore, there are two ways of weakening the principie of relevance. The first could 
bestatedas follows: 
Weakened principie of Relevance (I) 
Every act of communication (either genuine or non-genuine) conveys a set of 
assumptions {I}. If communication is genuine, it communicates the presumption 
of its own optimal relevance. 
However, (9) is just the first possibility analysed at the beginning of this section. That 
is, (9), if correct, is a principie for genuine communication; non-genuine communication 
rests unexplained. This means that a new, different principie should be proposed for the 
cases in which the presumption of optimal relevance fails. In other words, (9) means that 
the (weakened) principie of relevance is not the only principie governing language use. 
There is still an alternative. The concept of 'optimal relevance' has, in this case, to be 
weakened. Then, the principie of relevance would be stated as follows: 
Weakened principie of relevance (II) 
Every act of ostensive communication conveys the presumption of its own 
relevance. 
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Unfortunately, a principie like (10) cannot work. The problem is that once the idea of 
'optimality' has disappeared, there is no way of deriving the actual interpretation that the 
speaker has intended to convey to the audience. Remember that the principie of relevance 
is supposed to fill the gap between the linguistic meaning and the speaker's meaning. In 
Relevance theory, it is assumed that the addressee is able to grasp the most relevant 
interpretation of an utterance, and, in fact, the addressee will assume that the most relevant 
interpretation coincides with the speaker's meaning of the utterance just because the 
utterance communicates the presumption of its optimal relevance. 
To sum up, the principie of relevance is not applicable to non-genuine communicative 
uses of language. Therefore, there are two possible types of theories of linguistic activity. 
First, a theory that defines more than one principie governing linguistic activity. Second, 
a theory that postulates only one principie, a principie able to embrace both genuine and 
non-genuine communicative uses of language. 
4. Conclusions 
Relevance theory adopts the 'strong communicative hypothesis', which states that all uses 
of language are communicative. This assumption, plus a set of claims about human 
cognition, leads to the definition of the 'principie of relevance'. That is, all utterances carry 
a guarantee of optimal relevance so that the contextual effects produced by an utterance 
make its processing worthwhile. 
The main aim of this paper has been to argüe for the existence of different uses of 
language that cannot be inserted in this picture. In particular, some non-communicative uses 
of language such as inner speech, soliloquy and the cases of talking to pets or things have 
been pointed out. In all these cases, there is no audience, and these uses of language can 
hardly be considered as communicative. Obviously, in these cases, the speaker does not 
need to gain the audience's attention, and so, he does not have to be relevant. 
There are other cases in which, even though there is an audience, it is not possible to say 
that the speaker has to convey relevant information. Something like this occurs with 
filibusterers, who speak constantly regardless of what they are saying. Contrary to Sperber 
and Wilson, the filibusterers' case cannot be taken as an isolated, exotic case. On the 
contrary, it may be extended to cases where people use language for aesthetic pleasure or 
just for fun. 
All these cases militate against the strong communicative hypothesis. So, it has been 
claimed here, only the weak communicative hypothesis is valid. But this means that, 
contrary to Sperber and Wilson's claim, the principie of relevance cannot be the only 
principie governing language use. Nevertheless, what other principies governing language 
use look like should be the topic of future investigations. 
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1. It follows from Sperber and Wilson's comments that the set of assumptions {1} is stored 
in propositional format. This point has profound consequences .for the inferential model that 
underlies the interpretation process. However, this topic will not be discussed here. 
2. Moreover, Sperber and Wilson claim that communication is an inferential process. The 
inferential model of communication raises a lot of thorny questions. For mstance, 'the mutual 
knowledge problem', the nature of the inferential device that works out conclusions, etc. All these 
problems lie, however, outside the scope of this paper. 
3. An utterance produces effects only when it is merged with a context. In fact, the interpretation 
task makes use of two different sets of assumptions: (a) the sentence uttered, and (b) a subset of the 
assumptions contained in the addressee's encyclopaedic knowledge. The selection of this subset is 
crucial for the final interpretation of an utterance. As it will be shown later, this selection is done by 
'the principie of relevance'. 
4. The measurement of relevance is one of the most debatable topics in Relevance theory. But 
this question lies beyond this paper. 
5. For example, a person may say 'Your brolher has gone ' to an addressee who already knows 
this information. Nonetheless, the speaker has tried to be relevant. A different case results when the 
speaker says 'Mary Louise has gone to the zoo ' to somebody who does not know who Mary Louise 
is. The utterance is not relevant to the addressee because the speaker has wrongly believed that the 
addressee knew who Mary Louise was. 
6. There is a slightly different understanding of the principie of relevance in Sperber and Wilson 
(1988). Even though the quote just mentioned is quite conclusive, Wilson and Sperber (1988:141) 
also argüe that: "However, speakers have their own legitímate aims, and as a result may choose to 
offer some other information which is less than maximally relevant. Even so, to be worth the hearer's 
attention, this information must yield at least adequate effects, and the speaker manifestly intends the 
hearer to assume that this is so". 
7. Certainly, very naive conceptions of language adopt the strong communicative hypothesis. 
Saint Agustín, as Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigalions reports, thought of language as a 
system where sounds stood for things so that those sounds could express the speaker's desires. 
However, if more complex cases of language use are examined, the alleged communicative purpose 
of every utterance should be questioned. 
8. It is worth stressing that the strong communicative hypothesis is a universal claim. As such, 
it cannot be verified, but falsified. This is why, in this paper, possible counter-examples to the strong 
communicative hypothesis will be discussed. 
9. In particular, this is a frequent situation in childhood, as children's egocentric (or self-
directed) speech shows. 
10. The latter is the case , for example, when the speaker conveys information through nonverbal 
channels, like unconscious gestures of hands or head. 
11. This methodological point does not cióse the doors to this first possibility. In fact, linguistic 
performance is such a complex activity that it is plausible for a theory to be forced to postúlate more 
than one principie. 
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12. In fact, Sperber and Wilson's concept of 'ostensive communication' implies the 
comrnurucator's communicative intention, leaving asidethe cases mentioned in this paper. Therefore, 
a new way of weakening the principie of relevance is to revise their concept of ostensive 
communication. 
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